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Using a dataset of over 1.9 million messages posted on Twitter by about 25,000 ISIS members, 
we explore how ISIS makes use of social media to spread its propaganda and to recruit militants 
from the Arab world and across the globe. By distinguishing between violence-driven, theological, 
and sectarian content, we trace the connection between online rhetoric and key events on the 
ground. To the best of our knowledge, ours is one of the first studies to focus on Arabic content, 
while most literature focuses on English content. Our findings yield new important insights about 
how social media is used by radical militant groups to target the Arab-speaking world, and reveal 
important patterns in their propaganda efforts. 
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The Rise of Jihadist Propaganda on Social Networks 
Introduction 
Militant groups have long used traditional media and the Internet to disseminate information, 
spread their propaganda, and recruit potential militants (Cohen-Almagor, R. 2012). But no group 
to date has been as savvy in terms of its propaganda campaign and recruiting terrorists via the 
Internet, and specifically via social media platforms, as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 
(ISIS) (Shane & Hubbard, 2014). ISIS used a panoply of platforms, such as: Facebook, Instagram, 
Tumbler, Ask.fm, and most prominently, Twitter to spread its message (Bodine-Baron et al 2016). 
The group uses a very successful strategy of having an “online battalion” or the so-called “the 
mujtahidun (industrious)”, that is likely a small group of 500-2,000 active online members who 
post and retweet certain tweets to make these messages trending, increasing the group’s exposure 
and outreach (Berger & Morgan, 2015). 
Previous research worked on understanding ISIS’s social media presence (Bazan, Saad, and 
Chamoun, 2015; Klausen, 2015; Rowe and Saif, 2016; Ferrara, 2017) and the process of online 
radicalization (Bermingham et al. 2009; Edwards and Gribbon, 2013; Torok, 2013) that potential 
recruits go through. In this paper, we aim at identifying the topics that ISIS focuses on and 
investigate how offline events affect ISIS’s online rhetoric. We thus attempt to answer the 
following two questions: (i) What are ISIS members and sympathizers talking about on Twitter 
and how would we categorize their conversations? (ii) How are external events reflected in the 
ISIS Twittersphere? Using a dataset containing all the Twitter posts of about 25,000 ISIS members 
and sympathizers, totaling over 1.9 million tweets generated from January 2014 to June 2015, we 
analyzed the Arabic content of the tweets to answer these questions. The reason for exclusive focus 
on Arabic content is that the majority of ISIS members come from the Arab world; Arabic is the 
most used language among ISIS members and sympathizers (Magdy et al. 2016; Berger & Morgan, 
2015); and prior studies rarely focused on the Arabic content due to the numerous technical 
challenges. Additionally, Arabic posts constitute over 92% of ISIS activity in our dataset. In this 
study, we adopt state-of-the-art machine learning tools paired with human annotations to overcome 
these computational limits. 
Our study is not the first to be concerned with identifying the topics and rhetoric that radical groups 
come to focus on and adopt (Haverson et al. 2011, Lee and Leets, 2009, Leuprecht et al. 2010, 
Payne, 2009). Smith et al. (2008) found that violent groups tend to focus on in-group affiliation, 
having an impact and confidence in victory. Moreover, they describe themselves using morality, 
religion, and aggression rhetoric more than non-violent counterparts. Our study supports similar 
hypotheses: we will show that ISIS members talk mainly about topics related to violence and 
Islamic theology, with a strong sectarian tone in certain circumstances. Moreover, we will bring 
evidence that important offline events are strongly intertwined with online conversation, with 
certain topics dominating the conversation right before or after ISIS’s activity spikes. For example, 
we will show that increases in the incitement of violence by ISIS supporters and sympathizers on 
Twitter correlates with certain types of violent offline events; we will notice a steep rise in the 
theological talk following ISIS self-proclaiming itself a caliphate; concluding, we will observe an 
increase in the sectarian tone when the Iranian and Iraqi governments engage with ISIS.  
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Materials and Methods 
Data Collection  
We used a dataset of accounts associated with ISIS members and sympathizers. The identification 
of these accounts has been manually performed and validated in two stages: first, a crowd-sourcing 
initiative called Lucky Troll Club leveraged hundreds of volunteer annotators with expertise in 
Arabic to identify suspicious accounts that could be tied to ISIS, and reported them to Twitter. The 
usernames and account IDs of these users were compiled in a publicly-available list. Twitter’s 
anti-abuse team manually verified all suspension requests, and suspended all the accounts related 
to ISIS based on the violation of Twitter’s Terms of Service policy against terrorist- or extremist-
related activity (Ferrara et al. 2016). Of the Lucky Troll Club we retained only the accounts that 
have been actually suspended by Twitter via the double-verification mechanism. This yielded a 
little over 25,000 Twitter accounts associated with ISIS as an object of this study. These users 
were responsible for posting over 1.9 million tweets from January 2014 to June 2015. All these 
tweets were obtained through the Observatory on Social Media database (OSoMe) set up by 
Indiana University (Davis et al., 2016), which continuously collects the Twitter data stream from 
the Twitter API (a 10% random sample of the full Twitter data stream). This allowed us to obtain 
a large sample of the activity of these ISIS accounts, an important technical advantage since studies 
using small-sample data have shown well known biases (Morstatter et al., 2013). 
 
Data Analysis  
The first step of data cleaning was to retain only tweets in Arabic. This process removed about 8% 
of the tweets in the original dataset, the remainder 92% being written in Arabic. We then processed 
the tweets by means of so-called tokenization, using the NLTK tokenizer (Nltk). Tokenization is 
the process of splitting a piece of text into individual words, namely word tokens (or tokens in 
short). The tokens undergo further processing: we used the ISRIStemmer to stem them (Taghva, 
2005). Stemming is the process of reducing a word to its root (word stem). This will yield related 
words to map to the same stem. We removed all non-alphanumeric characters from the stemmed 
tokens, as well as all English alphabet, both in lower and upper case. Our goal is to identify the 
most commonly used stems in the ISIS tweets that have theoretical significance: In order to do 
this, we removed the stop words (using the stops words from (Alajmi, 2012) in Table VII) and 
then constructed a list of the top 100 stems used in the tweets under scrutiny.  
Out of the 100 top stems, 66 stems do not convey a clear meaning of what the authors are saying, 
such as: (To go out/exit, جرخ), (Land, ضرا), and (Do/Does, له), which leaves us with 34 stems 
that hold significant meanings. We decided to categorize these stems into four categories: violence, 
theological, sectarian, and names. The first three are the three main topics we found to be prevalent 
in the ISIS tweets. The last one, “Names”, includes both names of individuals as well as the Islamic 
State. In Tables I & II, we provide the list of stems that make up each category, along with their 
frequency in the whole tweets corpus. 
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We decided to be as conservative as possible in terms of choosing which stems would be included 
in these categories. For example, “Violence” only includes stems that incite violent actions. 
“Theological”, includes stems of words that are used frequently in Islamic theology or Fiqh. As 
for “Sectarian”, we included only derogatory terms of other groups, such as: “ضفر” for Rafidah 
(a derogatory term for Shia Muslims) (Stern & Berger 2015), “يفص” for Safawi (a derogatory term 
for Shia Muslims and it is the Arabized form of Safavid, the 16th century dynasty that established 
Iran as a Shia State), and “رفك” and “دتر” for infidel and apostasy respectively, which can be used 
as derogatory terms for Shias, Yazidis, Christians and even Muslims who do not adhere to ISIS’s 
vision of Islam.  
We used this dictionary-based approach to classify each tweet. We used this approach instead of 
a common alternative known as “bag-of-words”i because we believe that some individuals in our 
dataset wrote their messages in areas of conflict where the author might have written a short 
message instead of a longer one due to imminent danger. As such, classifying the tweets rather 
than the tokens enable us to avoid introducing a systematic bias due to exogenous events. 
We built a tweet classifier that counts how many stems are present in each tweet that belongs to 
the four categories mentioned above. We applied a majority-rule to classify the tweets: for each 
tweet, the category with the most stems represented in that tweet would be chosen as the category 
of the tweet itself. If a tweet has equal and maximum number of stems from two categories, we 
classified it as “Other”.ii Also, if a tweet has no stems from any of the categories, we classified it 
as “None” and excluded it from future analysis.  
We isolated tweets classified as “Other,” that contain at least one stem from the “Names” category. 
Since “Names” is the only category that does not have one defined theme, after removing the 
tokens classified under this category, we used the majority-rule again to classify the tweets as 
either “Violence”, “Theological”, or “Sectarian”. We named these categories as 
“Names+Violence”, “Names+Theological” and “Names+Sectarian” to identify three extra sets of 
tweets that concurrently identify named entities and one of the three other topics of discussion. 
In Table III, we provide examples of the tweets classified under each category. 
 
Results 
The classifier we built classified more than half of the tweets (56%) based upon the four categories 
mentioned in the data analysis section. In Table IV, we report the number of tweets classified 
under each category, the percentage of tweets classified under each category out of the whole 
dataset, and the percentage of the tweets classified under each category out of the tweets that were 
classified in one of the categories.  As for the “Other” category (Table V), the amount of tweets 
that we were able to classify under one of the three subcategories “Names+Violence”, 
“Names+Theological” and “Names+Sectarian”, is 55%.  
To represent the volume of the tweets, and how this changes over time, we plotted the ratio of each 
category to the whole number of the tweets in the dataset (Figure I). Moreover, for the “Names + 
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Category” dataset, we plotted the ratio of each category to the whole number of tweets in the 
“Names” category (Figure II).  
From both figures, it appears evident that the time series fluctuate and spikes can be observed at 
different point in time for different thematic categories. Social media literature has reported on 
correlations between offline and online events in a variety of cases, including during events related 
to social issues and conflicts (Conover et al., 2013; Varol et al., 2014). We further investigated to 
see whether a relationship exists between certain offline events and the Twitter chatter among ISIS 
members and sympathizers. We created a list (Table VI) with the most important events related 
to the four categories of topics we outlined earlier and plotted each category separately with a 
customized subset of offline events, which are the most relevant to the selected category. Figures 
III-VI show the ratio of the tweets in the four categories over the total number of tweets by week 
and the corresponding offline events related to that category. We included similar plots for the 
“Names + Category” classes in Figures VII-IX. 
 
Discussion 
More than half of the tweets in our dataset can be classified under the four categories we 
constructed: this suggests that a significant portion of chatter generated by ISIS members and 
sympathizers gravitates around the four issues outlined above. Two topics dominate the 
conversation, namely theological issues and violence. Looking at the share of these topics in the 
whole dataset and among those categorized suggests the importance of these two topics for ISIS: 
theological and violence related issues compose a little over 30% of all the tweets (and more than 
half of the ones classified). This fact warrants further discussion; thus, we try to draw some 
possible explanations. 
Violence plays a major part in ISIS’s brand and its appeal among ISIS followers. We suggest that 
ISIS transformed the goal of many Islamist groups. Since the foundation of al-Qaeda, Osama Bin 
Laden advocated focusing on the “head of the snake”, as he called the USA. He is arguing that 
once one destroys the source of “evil” that dominates Muslim countries, its puppets (Arab and 
Muslim leaders) would consequently lose power, and Islamic lands would be freed. This message 
insisted on gradualism and portrayed the battle between Jihadists and the US and its supporters in 
the context of David vs. Goliath. On the other hand, ISIS, from the start, refused to portray itself 
as an underdog, focusing on its victories, atrocious violent acts against minorities (and particularly, 
Shias, whom they used as a target in order to gain support among certain sectors of the Sunni 
community), and its call for an Islamic state. This was an intentional posture, which is reflected 
profoundly in its message to: 1) excite and attract many young men and women to this “exciting” 
and “victorious” journey that brings pride to its participants, and 2) to escape the spiritual 
hegemony of al-Qaeda-central and Ayman al-Zawahiri’s attempts to control the jihadi scene in 
Iraq and Syria. Therefore, we see a strong emphasis on violence-related topics in ISIS’s 
Twittersphere.iii Our results confirm this possible explanation: we see a trend of violence-related 
rhetoric rising around some of the offline events we outlined. Four events stand out: the 
crucifixions in Raqqa (Abdelaziz, 2014), the invasion of Mosul and Tikrit (Saddem Hussein’s 
hometown, a place of symbolic importance) by ISIS, the invasion of Sinjar (Yazidi town), and the 
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taking over of the Shaer gas field. All these events, annotated in the timelines, align faithfully with 
conversation spikes online (Figure III). As for the “Names + Violence” tweets, we see the same 
pattern of relationship with the crucifixions (Figure VII). These results provide support for our 
prior expectations and theoretical interpretations.  
For the theological tweets (Figure IV), we plotted the announcement of the caliphate and the 
sectarian events. Here, we expected a sharp rise in theological talk after the caliphate 
announcement, and suspected that ISIS, after inflicting violence upon minorities, would engage in 
theological defense and justifications for its actions. In line with what we hypothesized, we see a 
sharp increase in Twitter discussions among ISIS members and sympathizers after ISIS self-
pronounced itself a caliphate, suggesting how important the perception of this event was among 
ISIS followers.  For the “Names + Theological” tweets, we again see the same sharp rise in tweet 
volume after the announcement of the caliphate (Figure VIII). It is worth noting that ISIS’s digital 
magazine Dabiq focused on legitimizing the caliphate since the announcement of its establishment 
(Winter, 2015). This should not be surprising, since the concept of the caliphate plays a crucial 
role in political Islam and arguably in Islamic theology or Fiqh. To many Islamists, Muslims need 
an “Islamic” state where they can live their lives under the guidance of the Sharia, or in their view 
free from exogenous corrupting influences. The need for an Islamic state, especially since the 
collapse of the Ottoman Empire, has been a motivating cause for many Islamic groups, including 
the groups that some might see as moderate, such as the Muslim Brotherhood.iv   
For the “Sectarian” category plots (Figure V), we can see that the tweets under this category spiked 
in correlation with events that involves ISIS’s sectarian enemies, most notably the Iranian and the 
Iraqi governments. For example, around mid-June of 2014, when Iran deployed forces to aid the 
Shia-dominated Iraqi government take back Tikrit and when the latter asked the US to conduct 
airstrikes against ISIS, we see very visible spikes in the ISIS Twittersphere that include derogatory 
terms regarding Shias and others in general. Another very clear spike in the usage of such 
derogatory terms happened the Iraqi government launched a massive campaign to get back Tikrit 
in March of 2015. For the “Names + Sectarian” class, we see the same pattern: events involving 
the Iranian or Iraqi government usually coincide with, or slightly precede, spikes in this kind of 
tweets (Figure IX).  
Since the “Names” category includes names of various entities, we did not have a uniform 
expectation regarding the relationship of any specific offline event and the tweets classified under 
this category, except for the announcement of the caliphate. The “Names” category includes three 
stems related to the caliphate: a sharp rise in this category after the announcement of the caliphate 
by the leader of ISIS, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, appears as expected. (Figure IV). 
 
Conclusion 
The chaos in the aftermath of the US invasion and withdrawal from Iraq and the popular uprising 
against Assad in Syria in 2011 created a vacuum that enabled groups like ISIS to form. But why 
did ISIS and not another group emerge as the most important and powerful organization in this 
context? A major reason behind that, is its spectacular ability to spread its violent and nihilistic 
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message further and better than any of if its rivals, including established groups like, al-Qaeda. 
The most prominent way for ISIS to spread its propaganda is through online social platforms, most 
prominently Twitter. Thus, we attempted, using a dataset of millions of tweets posted by ISIS 
members and sympathizers during the one-year timeframe that witnessed ISIS’s rise, to capture 
what these members are talking about, what message they wanted to convey and how events on 
the ground affect the Twittersphere. We concluded that violence, Islamic theology, and 
sectarianism play a crucial role in ISIS messaging. In some cases, ISIS emphasis on some topics 
of discussion slightly anticipated events on the ground: for example, the use of sectarian language 
online toward those entities perceived as adversaries was systematic prior to executions and 
attacks. In other cases, ISIS focused on certain topics as an aftermath of offline events: this was 
the case, for example, when ISIS inflicted violence upon minorities, and then engaged online in 
theological defense and justifications for its actions. Possibly, the most prominent event during 
this period, in terms of its importance and perceived meaning to ISIS sympathizers, was the 
announcement of the caliphate. This event was both preceded and followed by several shocks in 
the Twittersphere, with multiple spikes occurring across different categories of discussion shortly 
before and slightly after the event. In conclusion, our work shed light on the ability of ISIS to 
systematically and programmatically corroborate its agenda with remarkable coordinated activity 
on social media. 
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Tables, Figures & Lists 
 
Table I 
Violence Theological 
Stem Translation Frequency Stem Translation Frequency 
لتق To kill 88732 فلخ Caliph 80664 
دهج Jihad 66268 بسح Judgment 
Day 
76116 
دهش Martyr  38027 دمح To Thank 70131 
كرع Fight 36195 نيد Religion  67908 
فذح Delete 34718 ربك To call for  56710 
برح War 29030 دحو To unite 
and it is 
usually 
used to 
express 
belief in 
one God 
44225 
فصق Bomb 27534 خيش Shiekh 37630 
رجف “Fajr” or 
dawn but 
also mean 
to explode 
24149 محر To have 
Mercy  
37369 
حتف Stem for 
military 
conquest in 
a religious 
sense 
22927 لسر Messenger  32847 
   يلو To rule or 
to be 
appointed 
to rule 
30352 
   عرش Stem for 
Sharia  
25916 
   روس Verse or 
wall 
22664 
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Table II 
Names Sectarian 
Stem Translation  Frequency Stem Translation Frequency 
ةيملاسلإا_ةلود Islamic State 
(ISIS in 
Arabic/how 
they liked to be 
called) 
111892  
 
ضفر 
To refuse, 
although 
here it 
would be a 
derogatory 
term for 
Shias 
66449 
ةفلاخلا_رابخا The Caliphate 
News 
65340 يفص Stem for a 
derogatory 
term for 
Shias 
40939 
ةفلاخلا_ةلو The Caliphate 
State 
52864 رفك Disbelief or 
Infidel 
32967 
شعد Stem for ISIS 30336 دتر Can be the 
stem for 
apostasy, 
also used as 
derogatory 
term for 
adherents of 
others sects 
and 
religions  
24884 
دسا Literally means 
lion, but here 
probably 
referring to 
Assad, whose 
name means 
lion in Arabic 
 
برغ West 26475 
رمع Omar (name) or 
age 
23504 
برع Arabs 22328 
مزحلا_ةفصاع Decisive Storm- 
military 
operation led by 
Saudi Arabic in 
Yemen 
22153 
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Table IIIv 
Category Date Tweet 
Names 1/20/2014  ملاعلاا تاقطره قدصي وهو هسأر أدصلا لكا مسق :نيمسق ىلإ مسقنا يبرعلا بعشلا
قحلا هل نيبتيل هسفنب ثحبي أدب رخلاا مسقلاو زافلتلا ءاملعو. 
Translation: The Arab Nation is divided into two sections: one, its 
head is eaten by rust, this section believes in the lies of the media 
and so-called “scholars” of the television and the other section, 
started looking for the truth by itself 
5/5/2015  تحبصأ هتميزهو تاهبجلا لك ىلع عجارتي دسلاا راشب نا دكوت ضرلاا ىلع عئاقولا
نمو ةيقذلالا# عارصلا لقتني اهدعب ،ادج ةحضاو… 
Translation: # Latakia and form the facts on the ground attest that 
Bashar al-Assad is pulling back on all fronts and his defeat has 
become very clear, after that, the struggle  
Sectarian  4/12/2015  نيب قرفلا شو مهيلع ةعيشلا نومعدي كماكحو قارعلاب ةعيشلا نودهاجي نيملسملا مه اذه
رلا يثوحلا؟يضفارلا يقارعلاو يضفا  
Translation: These are the Muslims who fight (Jihad in the verb 
tense) Iraq’s Shias and your leaders support the Shias against them 
(presumingly, the Sunnis), so what the difference (in Iraqi dialect) 
between a Rafidi Houthivi and a Rafidi Iraqi. 
5/29/2015  راد رقع يه ةيدوعسلا يف ةيقرشلا قطانملا نأ فرعيلا نم ةنسيسح يأ برضنس
يملاعإ للحم نوكي نأ هل قحيلا برعلا ةريزج ضفاور 
Translation: We will attack any Hussainiya,vii who does not know 
that the eastern parts of Saudi Arabia is the stronghold of the 
Arabian Peninsula’s (Saudi Arabia) Rafidah does not deserve to be 
a media analyst  
Theological 8/11/2014  ،منصلا رسك دق ،قيدنزب سيل وهف ةبعكلا لخد هنأ ىنعم سيل ملاعلا ملعيلو  لكل ةعفص هذه
هيلع جورخلا زوجي لاو رمأ يلو نيمرحلا نئاخ نإ دقتعي نم 
Translation: Let the world know, the fact that he entered the  
Kaaba does not change the fact that he is a Zindiqviii, the idol has 
been broken, this is a slap on the face for anybody that believes that 
rebelling against the “traitor of the two holy places” (a word play on 
the title of the Saudi Kings, “Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques”) 
and the Legal guardian (ruler in Islamic Fiqh) cannot be permitted 
(according to Islamic law)  
4/24/2015  لك نمو ،ًاجرـف ٍمه لك نم هل الله لعج رافغتسلاا مزل نم :ملاسلاو ةلاصلا هيلع لاق
بستحي لا ثيح نم هقزرو ،ًاجرخم ٍقيض 
Translation: (This is a saying by Prophet Mohamed) Peace and 
prayers be upon him said: “If anyone constantly seeks pardon (from 
Allah), Allah will appoint for him a way out of every distress and a 
relief from every anxiety, and will provide sustenance for him from 
where he expects not." (Hadith)  
Violence 1/1/2014  ىلع فيفختلل كلاذ و ةضفتنملا تاظفاحملا ةفاك يف تاهبجلا ةفاك حتف ادج يرورضلا نم
ليمعلا يرون تاوق تيتشتلو ةرئاثلا اهتيضقاو يدامرلا 
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Translation: It is very necessary to open all fronts in all 
revolting/rebellious provinces and that is in order to lessen the 
burden on Ramadi (city in central Iraq) and its rebellious 
neighborhoods and to distract/divide the forces of Nouri the traitor 
(referring to Nouri el-Maliki, the former prime minister of Iraq). 
6/6/2015  ةيملاسلإا ةلودلا دونج نم يدنج .. ةقور سنأ وبأ رجاهملا خلأا داهشتسا أبن مكل فزن
ةقرلا ةيلاو قرش كراعم يف كلذو 
Translation: We announce (with pleasure) the news of brother Abu 
Anas Warqa’ (the migrant) martyrdom, a solider among the soldiers 
of the Islamic State, and his martyrdom occurred in the battles of 
east Al-Raqqah Province.  
 
Table IV 
Categories  Number Out of the Total (%) Out of the 
Categorized (%) 
Names          168663 8.7 15.5 
Other        257670 13.3 23.7 
Sectarian     74731 3.9 6.9 
Theological    387090 20 35.6 
Violence     197950 10.2 18.2 
None       846912 43.8   
Total number of Tweets = 1,933,016; Total number of Tweets Categorized = 1,086,104 
 
Table V 
Names + Categories  Number  Out of the Total Names 
Dataset (%) 
Theological   50098 34.8 
Violence       40829 28.38 
Other    33664 23.4 
Sectarian      19490 13.5 
Total number of Names + Categories Tweets = 144,081 
 
 
Table VI  
Name Date Event Description  
 1/5/2014 Fallujah taken by ISIS 
 1/14/2014 Raqqa becoming the capital of ISIS 
 4/1/2015 Iraqi government takes over Takrit  
Crucifixions 5/1/2014 Crucifixions in Raqqa  
Mosul and 
Takrit 
Captured  
6/10/2014 Mosul and Takrit taken by ISIS 
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Iran Deploys  6/12/2014 Iran deploys forces to fight ISIS in Iraq, and helps Iraqi troops regain 
control of most of Tikrit.  
Iraq (USA 
Support) 
6/18/2014 Iraq asks the United States to conduct airstrikes against ISIS  
Caliphate  6/28/2014 ISIS announces the establishment of a caliphate and rebrands itself as 
the “Islamic State.” 
Shaer Gas 
Battle 
7/17/2014 ISIS storms the Shaer gas field and kills 270 people. 
Sinjar 
Captured 
8/2/2014 ISIS conquers Kurdish towns of Sinjar and Zumar, forcing thousands 
of Yazidi civilians to flee their homes. 
 8/7/2014 President Obama announces the beginning of air strikes against ISIS 
in Iraq to defend Yazidi citizens stranded in Sinjar 
 9/2/2014 Leaders from ISIS and its jihadist rival, Jabhat al Nusra, meet in 
Atareb to discuss joining forces. No formal merger or cooperation 
between the groups is established, but ISIS reportedly sent fighters to 
help the Nusra Front’s assault on Harakat Hazm, a Western-backed 
moderate rebel group  
Kobani 
Caputred 
9/9/2014 ISIS advances on the Syrian border town of Kobani and thousands of 
refugees flee into Turkey. 
 9/22/2014 ISIS spokesman Abu Muhammad al Adnani calls for attacks on 
citizens of the United States, France and other countries involved in 
the coalition to destroy the group  
 9/23/2014 The United States launches its first air strikes against ISIS in Syria 
 10/7/2014 The United States significantly ramps up airstrikes in and around 
Kobani to counter ISIS advances. 
 1/7/2015 Two gunmen, Saïd and Chérif Kouachi, attack the offices of French 
satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo in Paris, killing 11 people. A third 
assailant, Amedy Coulibaly, carried out a synchronized attack on a 
kosher supermarket, taking hostages and killing four people. 
Coulibaly reportedly declared allegiance to the Islamic State. 
 1/26/2015 Kurdish fighters, with the help of U.S. and coalition airstrikes, force 
out ISIS militants from the Syrian border town of Kobani after a four-
month battle 
Violent Acts 2/15/2015 -ISIS releases a video of Jordanian military pilot Moaz al Kasasbeh 
being burned alive. (2/4/2015)       
-Libyan militants allied to ISIS release a video showing the beheading 
of 21 Egyptian Christians, who had been kidnapped on January 12. 
Egypt launches airstrikes in Libya in retaliation. (2/15/2015)        
-ISIS militants abduct at least 200 Assyrian Christians in northeastern 
Syria. The U.S.-led coalition launches airstrikes in the same area. 
(2/25/2015) 
Takrit 
Liberated  
3/2/2015 The Iraqi government launched a massive military operation to 
recapture Tikrit with 30,000 Iraqi soldiers and backed by air force.  
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Yazidis 
Released  
4/8/2015 ISIS releases more than 200 captive Yazidis, most of whom had been 
held captive in northwestern Iraq since mid-2014. 
Christian 
Killings  
4/19/2015  ISIS posts a video showing militants from its Libyan branch 
executing dozens of Ethiopian Christians.  
Palmyra 
Captured  
5/20/2015 ISIS seizes the ancient Syrian city of Palmyra. 
 5/21/2015 ISIS militants take full control of Sirte, Libya-Muammar Qaddafi's 
hometown.  
Shite Attack 5/22/2015 ISIS claims responsibility for the suicide attacks on a Shiite mosque 
in eastern Saudi Arabia, which killed 21 people and injured more than 
100. 
 6/26/2015 ISIS fighters kill at least 145 civilians in an attack on Kobani, Syria. 
The same day, ISIS-linked militants attacked a Shiite mosque in 
Kuwait, killing 27 people and injuring more than 200. 
 
 
Table VII 
Stem  Translation  
يف In 
نم From 
نأ That 
يلع On 
يلإ To 
يتلا Which 
نع About 
لا No 
ام What 
اذه This 
(Male) 
هذه This 
(Female) 
ناك It was 
عم With 
و And 
كلذ That 
نيب Between 
مل Did not 
دعب After 
لك All 
يذلا Which 
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Notes 
i The bag-of-words model is a simplifying representation used in natural language processing where a piece of text 
is represented as the bag (multiset) of its words, disregarding grammar and even word order but keeping 
multiplicity. 
ii “Five” in the code 
iii For more on the subject, read chapter eight “The AQ-ISIS War” in (Stern & Berger, 2015) 
iv For more on the subject, read Milestones (Qutb 1964) 
v We used (Glen 2016) as a guide for choosing what events to put in this table. 
vi The Houthis are a Zaidi Shia-led religious-political movement based in Northern Yemen and is in engaged in 
ongoing battles with the current Yemeni government and Saudi Arabia. 
vii A gathering congregation hall for Shia commemoration ceremonies to commemorate the martyrdom of Imam 
Hussein. 
viii Term used in the medieval ages for Muslims who “strayed from the right path and in believing in monotheism”, 
could be punishable by death.  (Lewis 1993) 
                                                           
